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ABSTRACT
Traditional studies of combinatorial auctions often only con-
sider linear constraints (by which the demands for certain
goods are limited by the corresponding supplies). The rise
of smart grid presents a new class of auctions, character-
ized by quadratic constraints. Yu and Chau [AAMAS 13’]
introduced the complex-demand knapsack problem, in which
the demands are complex-valued and the capacity of sup-
plies is described by the magnitude of total complex-valued
demand. This naturally captures the power constraints in
AC electric systems. In this paper, we provide a more com-
plete study and generalize the problem to the multi-minded
version, beyond the previously known 1
2
-approximation al-
gorithm for only a subclass of the problem. More precisely,
we give a truthful PTAS for the case φ ∈ [0, pi
2
− δ], and a
truthful FPTAS, which fully optimizes the objective func-
tion but violates the capacity constraint by at most (1 + ),
for the case φ ∈ (pi
2
, pi − δ], where φ is the maximum angle
between any two complex-valued demands and , δ > 0 are
arbitrarily small constants.
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J.4 [Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Economics
Keywords
Combinatorial Power Allocation; Multi-unit Combinatorial
Auctions; Complex-Demand Knapsack Problem; Mechanism
Design; Smart Grid
1. INTRODUCTION
Auctions are vital venues for the interactions of multi-
agent systems, and their computational efficiency is criti-
cal for agent-based automation. Nonetheless, many practi-
cal auction problems are combinatorial in nature, requiring
carefully designed time-efficient approximation algorithms.
Although there have been decades of research in approx-
imating combinatorial auction problems, traditional stud-
ies of combinatorial auctions often only consider linear con-
straints. Namely, the demands for certain goods are limited
by the respective supplies, described by linear constraints.
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Recently, the rise of smart grid presents a new class of
auction problems. One of the salient characteristics is the
presence of periodic time-varying entities (e.g., power, volt-
age, current) in AC (alternating current) electric systems,
which are often expressed in terms of complex numbers1. In
AC electric systems, it is natural to use a quadratic con-
straint, namely the magnitude of complex numbers, to de-
scribe the system capacity. Yu and Chau [12] introduced the
complex-demand knapsack problem (CKP) to model a one-
shot auction for combinatorial AC electric power allocation,
which is a quadratic programming variant of the classical
knapsack problem.
Furthermore, future smart grids will be automated by
agents representing individual users. Hence, one might ex-
pect these agents to be self-interested and may untruth-
fully report their utilities or demands. This motivates us
to consider truthful (aka. incentive-compatible) approxi-
mation mechanisms, in which it is in the best interest of
the agents to report their true parameters. In [12] a mono-
tone 1
2
-approximation algorithm that induces a determinis-
tic truthful mechanism was devised for the complex-demand
knapsack problem, which however assumes that all complex-
valued demands lie in the positive quadrant.
In this paper, we provide a complete study and generalize
the complex-demand knapsack problem to the multi-minded
version, beyond the previously known 1
2
-approximation al-
gorithm. More precisely, we consider the problem under the
framework of (bi-criteria) (α, β)-approximation algorithms,
which compute a feasible solution with objective function
within a factor of α of optimal, but may violate the capac-
ity constraint by a factor of at most β. We give a (deter-
ministic) truthful (1− , 1)-approximation algorithm for the
case φ ∈ [0, pi
2
− δ], and a truthful (1, 1 + )-approximation
for the case φ ∈ (pi
2
, pi − δ], where φ is the maximum an-
gle between any two complex-valued demands and , δ > 0
are arbitrarily small constants. Moreover, the running time
in the latter case is polynomial in 1/( tan δ) (the so-called
FPTAS with resource augmentation). We complement these
results by showing that, unless P=NP, neither a PTAS can
exist for the latter case nor any bi-criteria approximation
algorithm with polynomial guarantees for the case when φ
is arbitrarily close to pi. Our results completely settle the
open questions in [12].
1
In the common terminology of power systems [7], the real part of
complex-valued power is known as active power, the imaginary part
is reactive power, whereas the magnitude is apparent power. Elec-
tric equipment has various active and reactive power requirements,
whereas power transmission systems and generators are restricted by
the supported apparent power.
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Because of the paucity of space, some proofs are deferred
to the extended paper.
2. RELATEDWORK
Linear combinatorial auctions can be formulated as vari-
ants of the classical knapsack problem [3,6,8]. Notably, these
include the one-dimensional knapsack problem (1DKP) where
each indivisible item has only one single copy, and its multi-
dimensional generalization, them-dimensional knapsack prob-
lem (mDKP). There is an FPTAS for 1DKP [8].
In mechanism design setting, where each customer may
untruthfully report her utility and demand, it is desirable to
design truthful or incentive-compatible approximation mech-
anisms, in which it is in the best interest of each customer
to reveal her true utility and demand [4]. In the so-called
single-minded case, a monotone procedure can guarantee in-
centive compatibility [10]. While the straightforward FP-
TAS for 1DKP is not monotone, since the scaling factor
involves the maximum item value, [2] gave a monotone FP-
TAS, by performing the same procedure with a series of
different scaling factors irrelevant to the item values and
taking the best solution out of them. Hence, 1DKP ad-
mits an truthful FPTAS. More recently, a truthful PTAS,
based on dynamic programming and the notion of the so-
called maximal-in-range mechanism, was given in [5] for the
multi-minded case.
As to mDKP with m ≥ 2, a PTAS is given in [6] based on
the integer programming formulation, but it is not evident
to see whether it is monotone. On the other hand, 2DKP is
already inapproximable by an FPTAS unless P = NP, by a
reduction from equipartition [8]. Very recently, [9] gave a
truthful FPTAS with (1 + )-violation for multi-unit combi-
natorial auctions with a constant number of distinct goods
(including mDKP), and its generalization to the multiple-
choice version, when m is fixed. Their technique is based on
applying the VCG-mechanism to a rounded problem. Based
on the PTAS for the multi-minded 1DKP developed in [5],
they also obtained a truthful PTAS for the multiple-choice
multidimensional knapsack problem.
In contrast, non-linear combinatorial auctions were ex-
plored to a little extent. Yu and Chau [12] introduced
complex-demand knapsack problem, which models auctions
with a quadratic constraint.
3. PROBLEMDEFINITIONSANDNOTATIONS
3.1 Complex-demand Knapsack Problem
We adopt the notations from [12]. Our study concerns
power allocation under a capacity constraint on the magni-
tude of the total satisfiable demand (i.e., apparent power).
Throughout this paper, we sometimes denote νR , Re(ν)
as the real part and νI , Im(ν) as the imaginary part of a
given complex number ν. We also interchangeably denote
a complex number by a 2D-vector as well as a point in the
complex plane. |ν| denotes the magnitude of ν.
We define the single-minded complex-demand knapsack
problem (CKP) with a set N = [n] , {1, . . . , n} of users as
follows:
(CKP) max
xk∈{0,1}
∑
k∈N
ukxk (1)
subject to
∣∣∣ ∑
k∈N
dkxk
∣∣∣ ≤ C. (2)
where dk = d
R
k + id
I
k ∈ C is the complex-valued demand
of power for the k-th user, C ∈ R+ is a real-valued ca-
pacity of total satisfiable demand in apparent power. Ev-
idently, CKP is also NP-complete, because the classical 1-
dimensional knapsack problem (1DKP) is a special case.
We note that the problem is invariant, when the argu-
ments of all demands are shifted by the same angle. Without
loss of generality, we assume that one of the demands, say
d1, is aligned along the positive real axis, and define a class
of sub-problems for CKP, by restricting the maximum phase
angle (i.e., the argument) that any other demand makes with
d1. In particular, we will write CKP[φ1, φ2] for the restric-
tion of problem CKP subject to φ1 ≤ maxk∈N arg(dk) ≤ φ2,
where arg(dk) ∈ [0, pi] is the angle that dk makes with d1.
We remark that in realistic settings of power systems, the
active power demand is positive (i.e., dRk ≥ 0), but the power
factor (i.e.,
dRk
|dk| ) is bounded by a certain threshold [1], which
is equivalent to restricting the argument of complex-valued
demands.
From the computational point of view, we will need to
specify how the inputs are described. Throughout the pa-
per we will assume that each of the demands is given by
its real and imaginary components, represented as rational
numbers.
3.2 Non-single-minded Complex Knapsack Prob-
lem
In this paper, we extend the single-minded CKP to gen-
eral non-single-minded version, and then we apply the well-
known VCG-mechanism, or equivalently the framework of
maximal-in-range mechanisms [11]. The non-single-minded
version is defined as follows. As above we assume a set N of
n users: user k has a valuation function vk : D → R+ over a
(possibly infinite) set of demands D ⊆ C. We assume that
0 ∈ D, vk(0) = 0 for all k ∈ N , and w.l.o.g., |d| ≤ C for all
d ∈ D. We further assume that each vk is monotone with
respect to a partial order ”” defined on the elements of C
as follows: for d, f ∈ C, d  f if and only if
|dR| ≥ |fR|, |dI| ≥ |f I|, sgn(dR) = sgn(fR), sgn(dI) = sgn(f I).
(We assume 0  d for all d ∈ D.) Then for all k ∈ N , the
monotonicity of vk(·) means that vk(d) ≥ vk(f) whenever
d  f .
The non-single-minded problem can be described by the
following program (in the variables dk):
(NsmCKP) max
∑
k∈N
vk(dk) (3)
s.t. (
∑
k∈N
dRk )
2 + (
∑
k∈N
dIk)
2 ≤ C2 (4)
dk ∈ D for all k ∈ N . (5)
Of particular interest is the multi-minded version of the
problem (MultiCKP), defined as follows. Each user k ∈ N
is interested only in a polynomial-size subset of demands
Dk ⊆ D and declares her valuation only over this set. Note
that the multi-minded problem can be modeled in the form
(NsmCKP) by assuming w.l.o.g. that 0 ∈ Dk, for each user
k ∈ N , and defining the valuation function vk : D → R+ as
follows:
vk(d) = max
dk∈Dk
{vk(dk) : dk  d}. (6)
We shall assume that the demand set of each user lies com-
pletely in one of the quadrants, namely, either dR ≥ 0 for
all d ∈ Dk, or dR < 0 for all d ∈ Dk. Note that the
single-minded version (which is CKP) is special case, where
|Dk| = 1 for all k.
We will write MultiCKP[φ1, φ2] for the restriction of the
problem subject to φ1 ≤ φ ≤ φ2 for all d ∈ D where φ ,
maxd∈D arg(d) (and as before we assume arg(d) ≥ 0).
3.3 Multiple-choice Multidimensional Knap-
sack Problem
To design truthful mechanisms for NsmCKP, it will be
useful to consider the multiple-choice multidimensional knap-
sack problem (Multi-mDKP) defined as follows, where we
assume more generally that D ⊆ Rm+ and a capacity vector
c ∈ Rm+ is given. As before, a valuation function for each user
k is given by (6). An allocation is given by an assignment
of a demand dk = (d
1
k, ..., d
m
k ) ∈ D for each user k, so as to
satisfy the m-dimensional capacity constraint
∑
k∈N dk ≤ c.
The objective is to find an allocation d = (d1, . . . , dn) ∈ Dn
so as to maximize the sum of the valuations
∑
k∈N vk(dk).
The problem can be described by the following program:
(Multi-mDKP) max
∑
k∈N
vk(dk) (7)
s.t.
∑
k∈N
dk ≤ c (8)
dk ∈ Dk, ∀k ∈ N . (9)
3.4 Approximation Algorithms
We present an explicit definition of approximation algo-
rithms for our problem. Given a feasible allocation d =
(d1, . . . , dn) ∈ Dn satisfying (4), we write v(d) ,∑k∈N vk(dk).
Let d∗ be an optimal allocation of NsmCKP (or (MultiCKP))
and Opt , v(d∗) be the corresponding total valuation. We
are interested in polynomial time algorithms that output an
allocation that is within a factor α of the optimum total val-
uation, but may violate the capacity constraint by at most
a factor of β:
Definition 3.1. For α ∈ (0, 1] and β ≥ 1, a bi-criteria
(α, β)-approximation to NsmCKP is an allocation (dk)k ∈
Dn satisfying ∣∣∣ ∑
k∈N
dk
∣∣∣ ≤ β · C (10)
such that
∑
k∈N
vk(dk) ≥ α ·Opt. (11)
Similarly we define an (α, β)-approximation to MultiCKP.
In particular, a polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS)
is a (1 − , 1)-approximation algorithm for any  > 0. The
running time of a PTAS is polynomial in the input size for
every fixed , but the exponent of the polynomial may de-
pend on 1/. An even stronger notion is a fully polynomial-
time approximation scheme (FPTAS), which requires the
running time to be polynomial in both input size and 1/.
In this paper, we are interested in an FPTAS in the resource
augmentation model, which is a (1, 1 + )-approximation al-
gorithm for any  > 0, with the running time being poly-
nomial in the input size and 1/. We will refer to this as a
(1, 1 + )-FPTAS.
3.5 Truthful Mechanisms
This section follows the terminology of [10]. We define
truthful (aka. incentive-compatible) approximation mech-
anisms for our problem. We denote by X ⊆ Dn the set
of feasible allocations in our problem (NsmCKP or Multi-
mDKP).
Definition 3.2 (Mechanisms). Let V , V1×· · ·×Vn,
where Vk is the set of all possible valuations of agent k.
A mechanism (A,P) is defined by an allocation rule A :
V → X and a payment rule P : V → Rn+. We assume that
the utility of player k, under the mechanism, when it re-
ceives the vector of bids v , (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ V, is defined as
Uk(v) , v¯k(dk(v))−pk(v), where A(v) = (d1(v), . . . , dn(v)),
and P(v) = (p1(v), . . . , pn(v)) and v¯k denotes the true valu-
ation of player k.
Namely, a mechanism defines an allocation rule and payment
scheme, and the utility of a player is defined as the difference
between her valuation over her allocated demand and her
payment.
Definition 3.3 (Truthful Mechanisms). A mecha-
nism is said to be truthful if for all k and all vk ∈ Vk, and
v−k ∈ V−k, it guarantees that Uk(v¯k, v−k) ≥ Uk(vk, v−k).
Namely, the utility of any player is maximized, when she
reports the true valuation.
Definition 3.4 (Social Efficiency). A mechanism is
said to be α-socially efficient if for any v ∈ V, it returns an
allocation d ∈ X such that the total valuation (also called
social welfare) obtained is at least an α-fraction of the opti-
mum: v(d) ≥ α ·Opt.
As in [5, 9, 11], our truthful mechanisms are based on us-
ing VCG payments with Maximal-in-Range (MIR) allocation
rules:
Definition 3.5 (MIR). An allocation rule A : V → X
is an MIR, if there is a range R ⊆ X , such that for any
v ∈ V, A(v) ∈ argmaxd∈R v(d).
Namely, A is an MIR if it maximizes the social welfare
over a fixed (declaration-independent) range R of feasible
allocations. It is well-known (and also easy to prove by a
VCG-based argument) that an MIR, combined with VCG
payments (computed with respect to range R), yields a
truthful mechanism. If, additionally, the range R satisfies:
maxd∈R v(d) ≥ α ·maxd∈X v(d), then such a mechanism is
also α–socially efficient.
Finally a mechanism is computationally efficient if it can
be implemented in polynomial time (in the size of the input).
4. A TRUTHFUL PTAS FORMULTICKP[0, pi
2
−
δ]
Problem Multi-mDKP was shown in [9] to have a (1−)-
socially efficient truthful PTAS in the setting of multi-unit
auctions with a few distinct goods, based on generalizing the
result for the case m = 1 in [5]. We explain this result first in
our setting, and then use it in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 to derive
a truthful PTAS for MultiCKP[0, pi
2
− δ]. We remark that,
without the truthfulness requirement, our PTAS works even
for δ = 0. However, we are only able to make it truthful for
any given, but arbitrarily small, constant δ > 0. Removing
this technical assumption is an interesting open question.
4.1 A Truthful PTAS for Multi-mDKP
Let c = (c1, . . . , cm) be the capacity vector, and for any
d ∈ D ⊆ Rm+ , write dk = (d1k, . . . , dmk ). For any subset of
users N ⊆ N and a partial selection of demands d¯ = (dk ∈
D : k ∈ N), such that ∑k∈N dk ≤ c, define the vector
bN,d¯ = (b
1
N,d¯, . . . , b
m
N,d¯) ∈ Rm+ as follows
biN,d¯ =
ci −∑k∈N dik
(n− |N |)2 . (12)
Following [9,11], we consider a restricted range of allocations
defined as follows:
S ,
⋃
N⊆N , d¯=(dk: k∈N): |N|≤m ,
dk∈D ∀k∈N
SN,d¯, (13)
where, for a set N ⊆ N and a partial selection of demands
d¯ = (d¯k ∈ D : k ∈ N),
SN,d¯ ,
{
(d1, . . . , dn) ∈ Dn |
∑
k∈N
dk ≤ c, dk = d¯k ∀k ∈ N,
∀k 6∈ N ∀i ∈ [m] ∃rik ∈ Z+ s.t. dik = rik · biN,d¯
and
∑
k 6∈N
rik ≤ (n− |N |)2
}
.
Note that the range S does not depend on the declarations
D1, . . . , Dn. The following two lemmas establish that the
range S is a good approximation of the set of all feasible
allocations and that it can be optimized over in polynomial
time. The first lemma is essentially a generalization of a
similar one for multi-unit auctions in [5], with the simpli-
fying difference that we do not insist here on demands to
be integral. The second lemma is also a generalization of
a similar result in [5], which was stated for the multi-unit
auctions with a few distinct goods in [9].
Lemma 4.1 ( [5]). maxd∈S v(d) ≥ (1− )Opt.
Lemma 4.2 ( [5, 9]). We can find d∗ ∈ argmaxd∈S v(d)
using dynamic programming in time
∣∣⋃
kDk
∣∣O(m/).
It follows that an allocation rule defined as an MIR over
range S yields a (1− )-socially efficient truthful mechanism
for Multi-mDKP.
4.2 A PTAS for MultiCKP[0, pi
2
]
We now apply the result in the previous section to the
multi-minded complex-demand knapsack problem, when all
agents are restricted to report their demands in the positive
quadrant. We begin first by presenting a PTAS without
strategic considerations; then is shown in the next section
how to use this PTAS within the aforementioned framework
of MIR’s to obtain a truthful mechanism.
In this section we assume that arg(d) ≤ pi
2
, that is, dR ≥
0 and dI ≥ 0 for all d ∈ D. As we shall see in Sec-
tion 5, it is possible to get a (1, 1 + )-approximation by
a reduction to the Multi-2DKP problem. We note fur-
ther that although there is a PTAS for mDKP with con-
stant m [6], such a PTAS cannot be directly applied to
MultiCKP[0, pi
2
] by polygonizing the circular feasible re-
gion for MultiCKP[0, pi
2
], because one can show that such
an approximation ratio is at least a constant factor. This
is the case, for instance, if the optimal solution consists of
a few large (in magnitude) demands together with many
small demands, and it is not clear at what level of accuracy
we should polygonize the region to be able to capture these
small demands. To overcome this difficulty, we first guess
the large demands, then we construct a grid (or a lattice) on
the remaining part of the circular region, defining a polygo-
nal region in which we try to pack the maximum-utility set
of demands. The latter problem is easily seen to be a special
case of the Multi-mDKP problem. The main challenge is
to choose the granularity of the grid small enough to well-
approximate the optimal, but also large enough so that the
number of sides of the polygon, and hence m is a constant
only depending on 1/.
Without loss of generality, we assume  < 1
4
where 1

∈
Z+. For an integer i ∈ Z+, let L1(i) and L2(i), respectively,
denote the sets of all horizontal and all vertical lines in the
complex plane that are at (non-negative) distances, form the
real and imaginary axes, which are integer multiples of C
2i
,
that is,
L1(i) , {x+ iy ∈ C | x = λC
2i
, λ ∈ Z+},
L2(i) , {x+ iy ∈ C | y = λC
2i
, λ ∈ Z+},
Given a feasible set of vectors T ⊆ D to MultiCKP[0, pi
2
]
(that is,
∣∣∑
d∈T d
∣∣ ≤ C), define dT ,∑d∈T d, and let
wIT ,
√
C2 − Re(dT )2−Im(dT ), wRT ,
√
C2 − Im(dT )2−Re(dT ).
(14)
Let ρ1(T ) and ρ2(T ) be the smallest integers such that
C
2ρ1(T )
≤ w
R
T
4
and
C
2ρ2(T )
≤ w
I
T
4
.
The set of lines in L1(ρ1(T )) ∪ L2(ρ2(T )) define a grid on
the feasible region at “vertical and horizontal levels” ρ1(T )
and ρ2(T ), respectively.
Let λ1(T ) and λ2(T ) be the largest integers such that
dRT ≥ λ1(T )C
2ρ1(T )
and dIT ≥ λ2(T )C
2ρ2(T )
,
and zT ∈ C be the intersection of the two lines corresponding
to λ1(T ) and λ2(T ):
zT , {x+iy ∈ C | x = λ1(T )C
2ρ1(T )
}∩{x+iy ∈ C | y = λ2(T )C
2ρ2(T )
}.
Given zT , we define four points in the complex plane (pi
′1
T , pi
1
T , pi
2
T , pi
′2
T )
such that
pi′1T =
(
0,
√
C2 − Re(zT )2
)
, pi1T =
(
Re(zT ),
√
C2 − Re(zT )2
)
,
pi′2T =
(√
C2 − Im(zT )2, 0
)
, pi2T =
(√
C2 − Im(zT )2, Im(zT )
)
.
Let RT be the part of the feasible region dominating zT :
RT , {x+ iy ∈ C : |x+ iy| ≤ C, x ≥ Re(zT ), y ≥ Im(zT )},
(15)
and PT () be the set of intersection points
2 between the grid
lines in L1(ρ1(T )) ∪ L2(ρ2(T )) and the boundary of RT :
PT () , {z ∈ RT : |z| = C} ∩ (L1(ρ1(T )) ∪ L2(ρ2(T ))).
The convex hull of the set of points PT ()∪{pi′1T , pi1T , pi2T , pi′2T ,0}
defines a polygonized region, which we denote by PT () and
its size (number of sides) by mT () (see Fig. 1a for an illus-
tration).
Lemma 4.3. mT () ≤ 18 + 3.
 
 
 
 
  
(a) We illustrate the region RT by the shaded area and PT () by the
black dots.
(b) Each in {σiT } is a vector (starting at the origin) perpendicular
to each boundary edge of PT ().
Definition 4.4. Consider a subset of users N ⊆ N and
a feasible set T , {dk : k ∈ N} to MultiCKP[0, pi2 ]. We de-
fine an approximate problem (PGZT ) by polygonizing Multi-
CKP [0, pi
2
]:
(PGZT ) max
∑
k∈N
vk(dk)
s.t.
∑
k∈N
dk ∈ PT ()
dk = dk, ∀k ∈ N
dk ∈ D, ∀k ∈ N\N.
Given two complex numbers µ and ν, we denote the pro-
jection of µ on ν by Pjν(µ) , ν|ν|2 (µ
RνR + µIνI). Given the
convex hull PT (), we define a set of mT () vectors {σiT },
2For simplicity of presentation, we will ignore the issue of
finite precision needed to represent intermediate calculations
(such as the square roots above, or the intersection points
of the lines of the gird with the boundary of the circle).
each of which is perpendicular to each boundary edge of
PT () and starting at the origin (see Fig. 1b for an illustra-
tion).
Definition 4.5. Consider a subset of users N ⊆ N and
a feasible set T , {dk : k ∈ N} to MultiCKP[0, pi2 ]. We
define a Multi-mDKP problem based on {σiT }:
(Multi-mDKP{σiT }) max
∑
k∈N
vk(dk) (16)
s.t.
∑
k∈N
|PjσTi (dk)| ≤ |σ
i
T |, ∀i = 1, . . . ,mT (), (17)
dk = dk, ∀k ∈ N (18)
dk ∈ D, ∀k ∈ N\N. (19)
Lemma 4.6. Given a feasible set T to MultiCKP[0, pi
2
],
PGZT and Multi-mDKP{σiT } are equivalent.
Lemma 4.6 follows straightforwardly from the convexity of
the polygon PT ().
Our PTAS for MutliCKP[0, pi
2
] is described in Algorithm
MultiCKP-PTAS, which enumerates every subset partial
selection T of at most 1

demands, then finds a near opti-
mal allocation for each polygonized region PT () using the
PTAS of Multi-mDKP from Section 4.1, which we denote
by Multi-mDKP-PTAS[·].
Algorithm 1 MultiCKP-PTAS({vk, Dk}k∈N , C, )
Require: Users’ multi-minded valuations {vk, Dk}k∈N ; ca-
pacity C; accuracy parameter 
Ensure: (1−3)-allocation (d̂1, . . . , d̂n) to MultiCKP[0, pi2 ]
1: (d̂1, . . . , d̂n)← (0, . . . ,0)
2: for each subset N ⊆ N and each subset T = (dk ∈ Dk :
k ∈ N) of size at most 1

s.t.
∣∣∑
d∈T d
∣∣ ≤ C do
3: Set dT ←∑d∈T d, and define the corresponding vec-
tors {σiT }
4: Obtain (d1, . . . , dn) ← Multi-mDKP-PTAS
[Multi-mDKP{σiT }] within accuracy 
5: if
∑
k vk(d̂k) <
∑
k vk(dk) then
6: (d̂1, . . . , d̂n)← (d1, . . . , dn)
7: end if
8: end for
9: return (d̂1, . . . , d̂n)
Theorem 4.7. For any  > 0, Algorithm MultiCKP-
PTAS finds a (1−3, 1)-approximation to MultiCKP[0, pi
2
].
The running time of the algorithm is
∣∣⋃
kDk
∣∣O( 12 ).
Proof. First, the upper bound on the running time of
Algorithm MultiCKP-PTAS is due to the fact that each
of the
∣∣⋃
kDk
∣∣O( 1 ) iterations in line 2 requires invoking the
PTAS of Multi-mDKP, which in turn takes
∣∣⋃
kDK
∣∣O(m/)
time, by Lemma 4.2, where m = O( 1

).
The algorithm outputs a feasible allocation by Lemma 4.6
and the construction of PT (). To prove the approximation
ratio, we show in Lemma 4.8 below that, for any optimal
(or feasible) allocation (d∗1, . . . , d
∗
n), we can construct an-
other feasible allocation (d˜1, . . . , d˜n) such that
∑
k vk(d˜k) ≥
(1− 2)∑k vk(d∗k) and (d˜1, . . . , d˜n) is feasible to PGZT for
some T of size at most 1

. By Lemma 4.6, invoking the
PTAS of Multi-mDKP{σiT } gives a (1− )-approximation
(d̂1, . . . , d̂k) to PGZT . Then∑
k
vk(d̂k) ≥ (1− )
∑
k
vk(d˜k) ≥ (1− 3)Opt.
We give an explicit construction of the allocation (d˜1, . . . , d˜n)
in Algorithm ??, thus completing the proof by Lemma 4.8.
Lemma 4.8. Consider a feasible allocation d = (d1, . . . ,
dn) to MultiCKP[0,
pi
2
]. Then we can find a set T ⊆ {d1, . . . ,
dn} and construct an allocation d˜ = (d˜1, . . . , d˜n), such that
|T | ≤ 1

and d˜ is a feasible solution to PGZT and v(d˜) ≥
(1− 2)v(d).
Lemma 4.9. Consider a set of demands S ⊆ D and T ⊆
S, such that
• S is feasible solution to MultiCKP[0, pi
2
], but S is not
a feasible solution to PGZT
• dR ≤ 
4
wRT and d
I ≤ 
4
wIT , for all d ∈ S\T .
Then there exists a partition {V1, . . . , Vh} of S\T such that
• either (i) ∑d∈Vj dR ≥ 4wRT for all j = 1, . . . , h,
• or (ii) ∑d∈Vj dI ≥ 4wIT for all j = 1, . . . , h.
where h ∈ [ 1

− 1, 4

).
4.3 Making the PTAS Truthful
We now state our main result for this section.
Theorem 4.10. For any , δ > 0 there is a (1 − 3)-
socially efficient truthful mechanism for multiCKP[0, pi
2
−δ].
The running time is
∣∣⋃
kDk
∣∣O( cot2 δ22 ).
Proof. It suffices to define a declaration-independent range
S of feasible allocations, such that maxd∈S v(d) ≥ (1− 3) ·
Opt, and we can optimize over S in the stated time.
One technical difficulty that arises in this case is that the
polygons PT () defined by a guessed initial sets T are not
monotone w.r.t. the set of demands in T , that is, if we
obtain T ′ from T by increasing one of th demands from dk to
d′k  dk, then it could be the case that PT () 6⊇ PT ′(). This
implies that the algorithm can be manipulated by a selfish
user in T who untruthfully increases his demand to change
his allocation by the algorithm and become a winner. To
handle this issue, we will show that the number of possible
polygons that arise from such a selfish user, misreporting
his true demand set, and can possibly change the outcome,
is only a constant in  and δ. Thus, it would be enough
to consider only all such polygons arising from the reported
demand set.
Since we assume that arg(d) ∈ [0, pi
2
−δ], for all d ∈ ⋃kDk,
we may assume further by performing a rotation that any
such vector d satisfies arg(d) ∈ [ δ
2
, pi
2
− δ
2
]. For convenience,
we continue to denote the new demand sets by Dk, and
redefine the valuation functions in terms of these rotated
sets. By this assumption,
tan
δ
2
≤ d
R
T
dIT
≤
(
tan
δ
2
)−1
, for any T ⊆ D. (20)
We may also assume, by scaling  by 2/(1 + 2 cot2 δ
2
) if nec-
essary, that
 ≤ 2
1 + 2 cot2 δ
2
. (21)
For T ⊆ D, let G(T ) be the set of vectors in C defined by
the union of {dT } and
(a) the (component-wise) minimal grid points z ∈ RT ,
such that z = `1 ∩ `2 for some `1 ∈ L1(ρ1(T ) + 1) and
`2 ∈ L2(ρ2(T ) + 1), and either ρ1({z}) = ρ1(T ) + 1 or
ρ2({z}) = ρ2(T ) + 1, but not both; and
(b) the (component-wise) minimal grid points z ∈ RT ,
such that z = `1 ∩ `2 for some `1 ∈ L1(ρ1(T ) + 1)
and `2 ∈ L2(ρ2(T ) + 1), and ρ1({z}) = ρ1(T ) + 1 and
ρ2({z}) = ρ2(T ) + 1.
Note that |G(T )| = O( 1

). For convenience of notation, let
us fix two subsets D1,D2 ⊆ D. For z ∈ G(T ), let us denote
by Sz(D2) the range of feasible allocations defined as in (13)
with respect to the Multi-mDKP problem with constraints
(17)-(19), when
(I) T is replaced by T ∪ {z− dT } (and hence, z is used to
define the polygon PT ());
(II) we add an additional “dummy” user n + 1 to N with
valuation vn+1(d) = 0 for all d ∈ D, such that the
vector z − dT as allocated to this user; and
(III) the set of vectors in N\N is chosen from D2.
Then we define the range S(D1,D2) as the union:
S(D1,D2) ,
⋃
T⊆D1: |T |≤ 1
 ⋃
z∈G(T )
Sz(D2)
 .
By Lemmas 4.1 and 4.8, we have maxd∈S(D,D) v(d) ≥ (1 −
3)Opt (since dT ∈ G(T )). It remains to argue that we
can efficiently optimize over S(D,D). Using Lemma 4.11
proved below, we argue that we can solve the optimization
problem over S(D,D) assuming that D = ⋃kDk, that is,
maxd∈S(D,D) v(d) = maxd∈S(⋃k Dk,⋃k Dk) v(d). One direc-
tion “≥” is obvious; so let us show that maxd∈S(D,D) v(d) ≤
maxd∈S(⋃k Dk,⋃k Dk) v(d).
Suppose that d∗ = (d∗1, . . . , d
∗
n) is an optimal allocation
over S(D,D), but such that d∗ ∈ Sz′ for some z′ ∈ G(T ′′),
T ′′ ⊆ D, and T ′′ 6⊆ ⋃kDk. Then let us show that there
is a set T ⊆ ⋃kDk, z ∈ G(T ), and d˜ ∈ Sz(D), such that
v(d˜) = v(d∗).
Define an allocation d˜ as follows: Let N = {k : d∗k ∈ T ′′};
for each k ∈ N , we choose d˜k ∈ Dk such that d˜k  d∗k and
vk(d˜k) = vk(d
∗
k), and we keep d˜k = d
∗
k if k 6∈ N . Let us
apply the statement of the lemma with T = {d˜k : k ∈ N},
T ′ = T ′′∪{z′−dT ′′}, and κ =
∑
k:k 6∈N∪{n+1} d
∗
k. If (i) holds
then dT + κ ∈ PT () and therefore we have
max
d∈S(D,D)
v(d) = max
d∈S(⋃k Dk,D) v(d). (22)
On the other hand, if (ii) holds, then ρ1(T
′) ∈ {ρ1(T ), ρ1(T )+
1} and ρ2(T ′) ∈ {ρ2(T ), ρ2(T )+1}. In this case, if ρ1(T ′) =
ρ1(T ) and ρ2(T
′) = ρ2(T ) then PT ′() ⊆ PT () (since dT 
dT ′), in contradiction that (i) does not hold; otherwise, there
is a point z ∈ G(T ) such that z  z′, ρ1(T ∪ {z − dT }) =
ρ1(T
′) and ρ2(T ∪{z−dT }) = ρ2(T ′). Then z+κ  z′+κ ∈
PT ′() ⊆ PT∪{z−dT }(), and we get again (22).
Finally, we note that
max
d∈S(⋃k Dk,D) v(d) = maxd∈S(⋃k DK ,⋃k Dk) v(d),
as follows from (the proof of) Lemma 4.2.
Lemma 4.11. Let T, T ′ ⊆ D be such that dT  dT ′ . Con-
sider a vector κ ∈ C such that dT ′ + κ ∈ PT ′(). Then
either (i) dT + κ ∈ PT (), or (ii) ρ1(T ′) ≤ ρ1(T ) + 1 and
ρ2(T
′) ≤ ρ2(T ) + 1.
Proof. Suppose that dT +κ 6∈ PT (). Then it also holds
that dT ′ + κ 6∈ PT () (since dT ′  dT ). This implies that
both dT + κ and dT ′ + κ lie within the same grid cell at
vertical and horizontal levels ρ1(T ) and ρ2(T ), respectively,
and hence dRT ′−dRT ≤ C2ρ1(T ) ≤
wRT
4
and dIT ′−dIT ≤ C2ρ2(T ) ≤
wIT
4
.
Form the definition (14) of wRT , we have
wRT = w
R
T ′ + d
R
T ′ − dRT +
(
dIT ′ − dIT
)( dIT ′ + dIT
dRT ′ + w
R
T ′ + d
R
T + w
R
T
)
≤ wRT ′ + w
R
T
4
+
wIT
4
(
dIT ′ + d
I
T
dRT ′ + d
R
T
)
≤ wRT ′ + w
R
T
4
(
1 +
wIT
wRT
· 1
tan δ
2
)
, (23)
where we use (20) in the last inequality. We can upper-
bound wIT /w
R
T by 2/ tan
δ
2
also using (20) as follows:
wIT
wRT
=
√
1−
(
dI
T
C
)2
+
dRT
C√
1−
(
dR
T
C
)2
+
dI
T
C
≤ 1 +
dRT
C√
1−
(
dR
T
C
)2
+
dR
T
C
tan δ
2
.
The latter quantity is bounded by f(1) = 2 tan δ
2
, since the
function f(a) , 1+a√
1−a2+a tan δ
2
is monotone increasing in
a ∈ [0, 1]. Using this bound in (23) and rearranging terms,
we get
wRT ′ ≥ wRT
(
1− 
4
(1 + 2 cot2
δ
2
)
)
≥ 1
2
wRT , (24)
by our assumption (21) on . From (24) and
wR
T ′
8
< C
2ρ1(T
′) ,
and C
2ρ1(T )
≤ wRT
4
, follows that ρ1(T
′) ≤ ρ1(T ) + 1. Simi-
larly, we have ρ2(T
′) ≤ ρ2(T ) + 1.
5. A TRUTHFULFPTAS FORMULTICKP[0, pi-ε]
As in [9], the basic idea is to round off the set of possible
demands to obtain a range, by which we can optimize over
in polynomial time using dynamic programming (to obtain
an MIR).
Let θ = max{φ− pi
2
, 0}, where φ , maxd∈D arg(d). We as-
sume that tan θ is bounded by an a-priori known polynomial
P (n) ≥ 1 in n, that is independent of the customers valu-
ations. We can upper bound the total projections for any
feasible allocation d = (d1, . . . , dn) of demands as follows:∑
k∈N
dIk ≤ C,
∑
k∈N−
−dRk ≤ C tan θ,
∑
k∈N+
dRk ≤ C(1 + tan θ),
where N+ , {k ∈ N | dRk ≥ 0} and N− , {k ∈ N | dRk < 0}.
Define L , C
n(P (n)+1)
, and for d ∈ D, define the new rounded
demand d̂ as follows:
d̂ = d̂R + id̂I ,

⌈
dR
L
⌉
· L+ i
⌈
dI
L
⌉
· L, if dR ≥ 0,⌊
dR
L
⌋
· L+ i
⌈
dI
L
⌉
· L, otherwise.
(25)
Consider an optimal allocation d∗ = (d∗1, . . . , d
∗
n) to Multi-
CKP [0, pi-ε]. Let ξ+ (and ξ−), ζ+ (and ζ−) be the respective
guessed real and imaginary absolute total projections of the
rounded demands in S∗+ , {k : dRk ≥ 0} (and S∗− , {k :
dRk < 0}). Then the possible values of ξ+, ξ−, ζ+, ζ− are
integral mutiples of L in the following ranges:
ξ+ ∈ A+ ,
{
0, L, 2L, . . . ,
⌈
C(1 + P (n))
L
⌉
· L
}
,
ξ− ∈ A− ,
{
0, L, 2L, . . . ,
⌈
C · P (n)
L
⌉
· L
}
,
ζ+, ζ− ∈ B ,
{
0, L, 2L, . . . ,
⌈
C
L
⌉
· L
}
.
Let further D̂ , { d
L
∈ D : dR ∈ A+ and dI ∈ B}, and note
that |D̂| = O(n2P3(n)
2
).
We first present a (1, 1 + 3)-approximation algorithm
(MultiCKP-biFPTAS) for MultiCKP[0, pi-ε]. Let N+ ,
{k ∈ N | dR ≥ 0 ∀d ∈ Dk} and N− , {k ∈ N | dR < 0 ∀d ∈
Dk} be the subsets of users with demand sets in the first and
second quadrants respectively (recall that we restrict users’
demand sets to allow such a partition).
The basic idea of Algorithm MultiCKP-biFPTAS is to
enumerate the guessed total projections on real and imag-
inary axes for S∗+ and S
∗
− respectively. We then solve two
separate Multi-2DKP problems (one for each quadrant) to
find subsets of demands that satisfy the individual guessed
total projections. But since Multi-2DKP is generally NP-
hard, we need to round the demands to get a problem that
can be solved efficiently by dynamic programming. We note
that the violation of the optimal solution to the rounded
problem w.r.t. to the original problem is small in .
Lemma 5.1. For any optimal allocation d∗ = (d∗1, . . . , d
∗
n)
to MultiCKP [0, pi-ε], we have
∣∣∑
k d̂
∗
k
∣∣ ≤ (1 + 2)C.
The next step is to solve the each rounded instance ex-
actly. Assume an arbitrary order on N = {1, ..., n}. We
define a 3D table, with each entry U(k, c1, c2) being the max-
imum utility obtained from a subset of users {1, 2, . . . , k} ⊆
N , each with choosing from D̂, that can fit exactly (i.e., sat-
isfies the capacity constraint as an equation) within capacity
c1 on the real axis and c2 on the imaginary axis. This table
can be filled-up by standard dynamic programming; we de-
note such a program by Multi-2DKP-Exact[·]. For a user
k ∈ N−, we redefine the valuation as v¯k(d) = vk(d¯), where,
for d ∈ D, d¯R = −dR and d¯I = dI. For a set F ⊆ D, we
write F¯ for the set {d¯ : d ∈ F}.
The following lemma states that the allocation returned
by MultiCKP-biFPTAS does not violate the capacity con-
straint by more than a factor of 1 + 3.
Algorithm 2 MultiCKP-biFPTAS ({vk, Dk}k∈N , C, )
Require: Users’ multi-minded valuations {vk, Dk}k∈N ; ca-
pacity C; accuracy parameter 
Ensure: (1, 1+3)-allocation (d˜1, . . . , d˜n) to MultiCKP[0, pi-ε]
1: (d1, . . . , dn)← (0, . . . ,0)
2: D̂+ ← { dL ∈ D : dR ∈ A+ and dI ∈ B}
3: D̂− ← { dL ∈ D : − dR ∈ A− and dI ∈ B}
4: for all ξ+ ∈ A+, ξ− ∈ A−, ζ+, ζ− ∈ B do
5: if (ξ+ − ξ−)2 + (ζ+ + ζ−)2 ≤ (1 + 2)2C2 then
6: F+ ←Multi-2DKP-Exact({vk, Dk}k∈N+ ,
ξ+
L
,
ζ+
L
, D̂)
7: F− ←Multi-2DKP-Exact({v¯k, Dk}k∈N− ,
ξ−
L
,
ζ−
L
, D̂)
8: (d′1, . . . , d
′
n)← F+ ∪ F−
9: if
∑
k vk(d
′
k) >
∑
k vk(dk) then
10: (d1, . . . , dn)← (d′1, . . . , d′n)
11: end if
12: end if
13: end for
14: for all k ∈ N+ do
15: Choose d˜k ∈ Dk s.t. d˜k  dk and vk(dk) = vk(d˜k)
16: end for
17: return (d˜1, . . . , d˜n)
Lemma 5.2. Let d˜ be the allocation returned by MultiCKP-
biFPTAS. Then |∑k d˜k| ≤ (1 + 3)C.
Theorem 5.3. For any  > 0, there is a truthful for
MultiCKP[0, pi-ε], that returns a (1, 1+3)-approximation.
The running time is polynomial in n and 1

.
Proof. We define a declaration-independent range S as
follows. For ξ+ ∈ A+, ξ− ∈ A−, ζ+, ζ− ∈ B, define
Sξ+,ξ+,ζ−+,ζ− , {d = (d1, . . . , dn) ∈ D̂n+ :∑
k∈N+
dRk = ξ+,
∑
k∈N+
dIk = ζ+,
−
∑
k∈N−
dRk = ξ−,
∑
k∈N+
dRk = ζ−}.
Define further
S ,
⋃
(ξ+−ξ−)2+(ζ++ζ−)2≤(1+2)2C2
Sξ+,ξ+,ζ−+,ζ− .
Using Algorithm MultiCKP-biFPTAS, we can optimize
over S in time polynomial in n and 1

. Thus, it remains only
to argue that the algorithm returns a (1, 1+3)-approximation
w.r.t. the original range Dn. To see this, let d∗1, . . . , d∗n ∈ D
be the demands allocated in the optimum solution to Multi-
CKP, and d˜1, . . . , d˜n ∈ D be the demands allocated by
MultiCKP-biFPTAS. Then by Lemma 5.1, the truncated
optimal allocation (d̂∗1, . . . , d̂
∗
n) is feasible with respect to a
capacity of (1 + 2)C, and thus its projections will satisfy
the condition in Step 5 of Algorithm ??. It follows that
v(d˜) ≥ v(d̂∗) ≥ v(d∗) = Opt, where the second inequality
follows from the way we round demands (25) and the mono-
tonicity of the valuations. Finally, the fact that the solution
returned byMultiCKP-biFPTAS violates the capacity con-
straint by a factor of at most (1 + 3) follows readily from
Lemma 5.2.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we provided truthful mechanisms for an
important variant of the knapsack problem with complex-
valued demands. We gave a truthful PTAS when all demand
sets of users lie in the positive quadrant, and a bi-criteria
truthful FPTAS when some of the demand sets can lie in the
second quadrant. In the full version of the paper, we show
that these are essentially the best possible results in terms of
approximation guarantees, assuming P6=NP.
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